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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 Bryann Kristine Lemmons appeals from her sentences for two convictions 
for trafficking in methamphetamine. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 Lemmons “was found guilty by a jury of two counts of trafficking in 
methamphetamine by delivering methamphetamine and two counts of trafficking 
in methamphetamine by conspiring to deliver methamphetamine.”  State v. 
Lemmons, 158 Idaho 971, 972, 354 P.3d 1186, 1187 (2015).  The district court 
imposed concurrent sentences of 15 years with three years determinate on each 
conviction.  (R., pp. 35-36, 86-87.)  The district court also imposed $10,000 fines 
on each conviction.  (Id.)  Lemmons filed notices of appeal timely from entry of 










 Lemmons states the issue on appeal as: 
 Does the district court have the discretionary authority to run 
mandatory $10,000 fines under I.C. § 37-2732B(3) concurrently?  If 
so, did the court here abuse its discretion in declining to do so? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Lemmons failed to show that the district court had discretionary 
authority to order that Lemmons get $4.00 of credit toward her fines for every 












Lemmons Has Failed To Show That The District Court Had Discretionary 
Authority To Order That She Get $4.00 Of Credit Toward Her Fines For Every 




 The district court imposed the mandatory minimum fines of $10,000 on 
each of Lemmons’ four trafficking convictions.  (R., pp. 35-36, 86-87.)  On appeal 
Lemmons argues the district court erred by rejecting her argument below that the 
fines could be run “concurrently.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-7.)  Although the state 
does not object to Lemmons paying her fines at the same time, her argument 
that the district court can order that she be given credit for $4.00 in payments for 
every $1.00 she in fact pays is contrary to the plain language of the applicable 
statutes. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review.  State v. Thompson, 
140 Idaho 796, 798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404, 
405, 94 P.3d 709, 710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 
C. The Authority To Run Terms Of Imprisonment Concurrently Or 
Consecutively Does Not Apply To Fines 
 
 The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative 
intent.  State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v. 
Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003).  Because the 




interpretation of a statute must begin with its literal words.  Verska v. Saint 
Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011); 
State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009).  The words of a 
statute “‘must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute 
must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does 
not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.’”  Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 
265 P.3d at 506 (quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 
721 (2003)).  “[W]here statutory language is unambiguous, legislative history and 
other extrinsic evidence should not be consulted for the purpose of altering the 
clearly expressed intent of the legislature.”  Id. (quoting City of Sun Valley v. Sun 
Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 P.2d 961, 963 (1993)). 
 A person convicted of trafficking in 28 to 200 grams of methamphetamine 
“shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum fixed term of imprisonment of three 
(3) years and fined not less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000).”  I.C. § 37-
2732B(a)(4)(A).  The applicable sentence, therefore, is a mandatory minimum of 
three years, and the applicable fine is at least $10,000.  Because the applicable 
fine for each of the four convictions is $10,000, the minimum total amount of fines 
applicable to Lemmons was $40,000, the amount ordered by the district court.  
The district court did not err by declining Lemmons’ request to effectively reduce 
the total to $10,000. 
 Lemmons argues that the district court had discretion to order the fines for 
her four convictions run “concurrent.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-7.)  For this 




impose sentences either consecutively or concurrently.  (Id.)  The statute, 
however, provides that “terms of imprisonment” may be ordered served 
consecutively.  I.C. § 18-308.  This statute, “does not limit the authority of the 
district courts to impose consecutive sentences.”  State v. Lawrence, 98 Idaho 
399, 401, 565 P.2d 989, 991 (1977).  None of the authority cited by Lemmons 
addresses the concept of “concurrent fines.”  Lemmons has failed to show that 
the statutory and common law authority of the court to run terms of imprisonment 
either consecutively or concurrently extends to fines such that fines on some 
counts are excused from payment.   
 Indeed, the concept of “concurrent fines” is an oxymoron.  “Concurrent” is 
defined as “operating or occurring at the same time.”  http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/concurrent (visited 9/20/16).  While it is certainly possible 
for two terms of imprisonment to operate or occur at the same time, paying two 
fines at the same time does not change the amount of money paid or owed.  It 
was not within the discretion of the district court to grant Lemmons $4.00 of credit 
for every $1.00 she pays toward her mandatory fines by ordering the fines paid 
“concurrently.”  Lemmons has therefore failed to demonstrate that the district 








 The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s 
judgments. 
 DATED this 26th day of September, 2016. 
 
 
      __/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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